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INTRODUCTION
Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) in 1925 in
response to judicial hostility towards arbitration agreements.1 Over
three quarters of a century later American courts seem to have
outgrown this former sentiment, as the Supreme Court’s recent
application of the FAA has ushered in a new era of pro-arbitration
jurisprudence.2 Although conceding that arbitration is, at heart, a
matter of contract law,3 the Court has zealously applied Section 2 of
the FAA, which states arbitration agreements shall be “valid,
irrevocable and enforceable,”4 to favor arbitration over litigation.5

1

Anjanette H. Raymond, It Is Time the Law Begins to Protect Consumers
From Significantly One-Sided Arbitration Clauses within Contracts of Adhesion, 91
NEB. L. REV. 666, 668 (2013).
2
Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Third Arbitration Trilogy: Stolt-Nielsen, Rent-ACenter, Concepcion and the Future of American Arbitration, 22 AM. REV. INT’L
ARB. 323, 325 (2011).
3
Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309 (2013).
4
9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
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Writing in the Supreme Court’s shadow, in Green v. U.S. Cash
Advance Illinois, LLC, the Seventh Circuit majority enforced an
arbitration agreement in a payday loan between a consumer, Ms.
Green and lender, the Loan Machine.6 The arbitration agreement
identified the National Arbitration Forum (“NAF”) as the arbitration
forum in the event of a dispute; however, the NAF had stopped
accepting consumer arbitrations due to a settlement agreement with
the Minnesota Attorney General.7 Although the NAF’s settlement
agreement occurred prior to Ms. Green’s loan, the parties never
updated the language of the Loan Machine’s form arbitration
agreement.8 The majority engaged in an ad hoc analysis to reach the
wrong conclusion – the enforcement of the arbitration agreement
despite the unavailability of the NAF.9
In its opinion, the majority rejected what is known as the integral
part test, which has been used by the Third, Fifth and Eleventh
circuits10 in factually similar situations. The integral part test bars the
appointment of a substitute arbitrator if the provision naming the
arbitrator was “an integral part of the agreement.”11
Judge Hamilton, in dissent, also rejected the integral part test,
however, he contended that the unavailability of the arbitration forum
renders the arbitration agreement void, allowing the parties to proceed
with litigation.12 He noted the majority’s reasoning departed from the
contractual foundation of arbitration because the NAF as the parties’
exclusive choice of forum, was not available at the time of contracting
5

See Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010);
Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010); AT&T Mobility LLC
v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011); Am. Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S.
Ct. 2304 (2013).
6
Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Illinois, LLC, 724 F.3d 787 (7th Cir. 2013).
7
Id. at 789.
8
Id. at 797 (Hamilton, J. dissenting).
9
Id.
10
Id. at 791; see Khan v. Dell, Inc., 669 F. 3d 350, 354-56 (3d Cir. 2012);
Ranzy v. Tijerina, 393 F. App'x 174, 176 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam); Brown v. ITT
Consumer Fin. Corp., 211 F.3d 1217, 1222 (11th Cir. 2000).
11
Khan, 669 F. 3d at 353.
12
Green, 734 F.3d at 793 (Hamilton, J. dissenting).
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and thus the agreement was void.13 Judge Hamilton argued that the
practical result of the majority approach is that a court may use the
FAA to authorize a “wholesale re-write of the parties’ contract”14 when
there had been a mutual mistake as to a material term.
This Comment argues that the Seventh Circuit majority reached
the wrong conclusion in Green. Part I of this Comment introduces the
FAA and the two sections at issue in the case. Part II reviews the
Supreme Court’s recent interpretation of the FAA. Part III introduces
the problem presented in Green, examines the solutions implemented
by other circuits, and discusses the Green decision. Part IV considers
the decision’s impact on the parties and future litigants, and addresses
proposed solutions.
I. THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT
A. History
Arbitration is a method of dispute resolution involving one or
more neutral third parties who are usually agreed to by the disputing
parties and whose decision is binding.15 In 192516 Congress passed the
Federal Arbitration Act, formerly the “United States Arbitration
Law,”17 in response to widespread judicial hostility towards arbitration
agreements.18 The aggression exhibited by United States courts has
13

Id.
Id.
15
Arbitration Definition, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009), available
at Westlaw BLACKS.
16
Raymond, supra note 1, at 668.
17
Angelina M. Petti, Judicial Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements: The
Stay-Dismissal Dichotomy of FAA Section 3, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 565, 572 (2005).
18
Raymond, supra note 1, at 668#; see also Steven J. Burton, The New Judicial
Hostility to Arbitration: Federal Preemption, Contract Unconscionability, and
Agreements to Arbitrate, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 469, 476 (2006) (noting that although
this law was enacted in 1925, American judicial hostility persisted until 1967 when
the United States Supreme Court decided Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin
Mfg. Co., when the Court “eliminated any powerful judicial role in supervising
arbitration agreements.”).
14
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been linked to the same opposition expressed by English courts.19
English courts viewed an arbitration agreement as ousting the court of
its jurisdiction until England’s Arbitration Act of 1889, which provided
the country’s first set of laws to facilitate arbitration.20 Explanations
for American judicial hostility towards such agreements are similar to
that of the English – that it would oust the jurisdiction of the court; but
also the fear that stronger parties would take advantage of weaker
ones.21
In the early twentieth century, American judges began to change
their minds about the enforceability of arbitration agreements.22 This
change culminated in a 1924 New York state court decision, Red Cross
Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co.,23 which upheld a New York law compelling
arbitration in a dispute involving a maritime contract.24 Julius Cohen, a
lawyer who was later the principal drafter of the FAA, wrote that New
York law.25 Red Cross Line paved the way for Congress to enact a
federal arbitration law that recognized arbitration agreements as
binding and valid: the Federal Arbitration Act.26

19

Preston Douglas Wigner, The United States Supreme Court's Expansive
Approach to the Federal Arbitration Act: A Look at the Past, Present, and Future of
Section 2, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 1499, 1502 (1995).
20
Burton, supra note 18, at 474. Additionally, English Judges were paid based
on the number of cases they decided, and as a result, felt that arbitration outside of
the courtroom infringed upon their livelihood. Wigner, supra note 19, at 1502.
21
Stephen E. Friedman, The Lost Controversy Limitation of the Federal
Arbitration Act, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 1005, 1008 (2012); see also Kulukundis
Shipping Co., S/A, v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 982–85 (2d Cir. 1942)
(Justice Frank discussing the history of the judicial attitude towards arbitration).
22
John C. Norling, The Scope of the Federal Arbitration Act's Preemption
Power: An Examination of the Import of Saturn Distribution Corp. v. Williams, 7
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 139, 140 (1991).
23
Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109 (1924).
24
JON O. SHIMABUKURO, CONG. RES. SERVICE, THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION
ACT: BACKGROUND AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 2 (2003)
25
Margaret L. Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: How the Supreme Court
Created a Federal Arbitration Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA ST. U. L.
REV. 99, 101-02 (2006).
26
SHIMABUKURO, supra note 24, at 2.
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President Coolidge signed the Federal Arbitration Act into law on
February 12, 1925.27 During the Joint Hearings on the FAA, a
chairman from the Joint Subcommittee on the Judiciary asked Mr.
Cohen why a contract for arbitration had not been enforceable in
equity.28 Mr. Cohen stated that “the fundamental reason” for it’s nonenforceability, was that stronger men would take advantage of the
weaker, and that “courts had to come in and protect them.”29 However,
Mr. Cohen noted that this concern was dispelled by the regulation of
the Federal Government and the general notion that “people are
protected today [sic] as never before.”30
As drafted, the FAA was understood by members of Congress to
“simply provide for one thing, and that is to give an opportunity to
enforce an agreement in commercial contracts and admiralty
contracts.”31 Throughout the 1924 Hearing, statements were made that
“arbitration saves time, saves trouble, saves money.”32 Thus, the
legislative history of the FAA suggests two purposes: to affirm the
validity of arbitration agreements as “binding contract provisions in
their own right” and to eliminate “costly and time-consuming
litigation.”33

27

Id.
Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Hearing on S. 1005 and H.R.
646 Before the Subcomm. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 14 (1924) (statement of
Julius Henry Cohen, Member, Comm. on Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law of
the Am. Bar Ass'n and Gen. Counsel of N.Y. State Chamber of Commerce).
29
Id. at 15.
30
Id.
31
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 124 (2001) (Stevens, J.
dissenting) (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
32
Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Hearing on S. 1005 and H.R.
646 Before the Subcomm. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 7 (1924) (statement of
Charles L. Bernheimer, Chairman Comm. on Arbitration).
33
Benjamin D. Tievsky, The Federal Arbitration Act After Alafabco: A Case
Analysis, 11 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 675, 678 (2010).
28
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B. Text
At the heart of the legal dispute in Green was the enforceability of
the arbitration clause in a payday loan agreement, which named an
unavailable arbitration forum.34 To answer this question, the court
looked to Section 2 and Section 5 of the FAA.35
Section 2 evidences Congress’s intent to place arbitration
agreements “upon the same footing as other contracts, where [they]
belong.”36 It provides that a written arbitration agreement in a
transaction or contract involving commerce is “valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.”37 Thus, Section 2 is a platform for the
courts to find that there is a “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration
agreements.”38
Section 5, on the other hand, is a tool that allows the judiciary to
appointment an arbitrator in limited circumstances.39 Those
circumstances are: if no method of naming an arbitrator is provided for
in the agreement; if there is a method of naming the arbitrator, but a
party fails to avail himself of that method; and if for any other reason
there is a “lapse” in the naming of an arbitrator.40 While Section 5 is
the specific tool the Green majority used to enforce the arbitration
34

Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Illinois, LLC, 724 F.3d 787, 791-93 (7th Cir.

2013).
35

Id. at 792–93.
SHIMABUKURO, supra note 24, at 2 (footnote omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
37
9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). The complete text of Section 2:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter
arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole
or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an
existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall
be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law
or in equity for the revocation of any contract
38
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 472 U.S. 614, 625
(1985).
39
9 U.S.C. § 5 (2012).
40
Id.
36
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clause in the loan agreement, the Seventh Circuit also followed the
footsteps of the Supreme Court, which has consistently enforced
arbitration agreements using Section 2 of the FAA.
II. THE FAA AND RECENT PRO-ARBITRATION SUPREME COURT
DECISIONS
In the years before Green, the application of the FAA by the
Roberts Court has been pro-arbitration, resulting in a trend of favoring
big business over small business, and business over the consumer.41 In
the 2010-2011 term, the Supreme Court decided what has been
referred to as an arbitration trilogy.42 This triad of cases demonstrates a
strong federal policy of vigorously enforcing agreements to arbitrate.
Then, in the summer of 2013 the Supreme Court added to the spirit of
this trilogy with a fourth decision, American Express Co. v. Italian
Colors Restaurant.
In Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., the first in this
series of four decisions, a group of parcel tanker43 customers brought a
class action antitrust suit against Stolt-Nielsen, a shipping company,
for price fixing.44 The parties eventually agreed they must arbitrate
their antitrust claim pursuant to the arbitration agreement in their
charter contract, but they were unsure whether the arbitration
agreement permitted class arbitration.45 This question was submitted
to a panel of arbitrators, who after hearing argument and evidence
concluded that the arbitration clause allowed class arbitration.46

41

See Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010);
Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010); AT&T Mobility LLC
v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1744 (2011); Am. Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest.,
133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
42
Stipanowich, supra note 2, at 328.
43
Parcel tankers are seagoing vessels with compartments that are separately
chartered to customers such as AnimalFeeds, who shipped liquids in small
quantities. Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 666 (2010).
44
Id. at 667.
45
Id. at 668.
46
Id. at 668–69.
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However, the Supreme Court reversed, and found the arbitration
agreement must be enforced according to its terms.47
During litigation, AnimalFeeds stipulated the arbitration provision
in their charter contract was silent on the issue of class arbitration,48
and argued that without express prohibition, class arbitration should be
permitted.49 As arbitration is a matter of contract, the Court concluded
that a party, even a sophisticated business entity, “may not be
compelled under the FAA to submit to class arbitration unless there is
a contractual basis for concluding that the parties agreed to do so.”50
Implicit in the Court’s reasoning is a foundation of contract law, which
requires a meeting of the minds to establish a valid contract.51 Thus,
the court held that there could be no class-action arbitration when the
parties have conceded there was no prior agreement on the matter.52
The Court mandated bilateral arbitration.53
Later that year, in the second of the four cases, the Court
addressed how a party can challenge the validity of an arbitration
agreement. There are two types of validity challenges: one challenges
the validity of the arbitration agreement itself and the other challenges
the contract as a whole.54 If the arbitration agreement itself is
challenged and determined to be invalid by the court, it can be severed
from the remainder of the contract.55 In Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v.
Jackson, an employee filed a discrimination suit against his former
employer, who responded by filing a motion to compel arbitration
pursuant to the employment contract.56 The employee argued that the
entire employment contract was unconscionable and should not be

47

Id. at 682.
Id. at 668.
49
Id. at 672.
50
Id. at 684 (alteration in original).
51
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 17 cmt. c (1981).
52
Id. at 687; see also Stipanowich, supra note 2, at 333.
53
Stolt-Nielsen S.A., 559 U.S. at 687.
54
Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2778 (2010) (citation
omitted).
55
Id.
56
Id. at 2775.
48
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enforced.57 The Court concluded that because the employee was
challenging the contract as a whole, rather than the arbitration
agreement itself, this challenge was for the arbitrator to resolve.58
Thus, the Court limited its ability to police an overreaching arbitration
agreement by empowering arbitrators to determine their own
jurisdiction.59
In the third case, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion the Court
revisited a claim for class arbitration and ruled in a 5-4 opinion that
the FAA preempted a state law prohibiting adhesion contracts from
disallowing class arbitration.60 The plaintiffs had alleged that AT&T
engaged in false advertising and fraud by charging a sales tax on
“free” phones.61 The lawsuit, originally filed by the Concepcions, was
consolidated as a class action. AT&T then filed a motion to compel
arbitration under the Concepcions’ cell phone contract, which stated
that class arbitration was waived.62
The District Court and then the Ninth Circuit applied California’s
unconscionability doctrine,63 as expressed in the state court decision
Discover Bank v. Superior Court, to invalidate the class waiver in the
Concepcions’ cell phone contract.64 The Discover Bank doctrine
allows any party to a consumer contract of adhesion to demand
57

Id. at 2779.
Id.
59
Stipanowich, supra note 2, at 367, 370.
60
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011).
61
Id. at 1744–45.
62
Id. at 1744.
63
Id. at 1746, citing Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110
(Cal. 2005) which held:
[W]hen the waiver is found in a consumer contract of adhesion in a setting in
which disputes between the contracting parties predictably involve small
amounts of damages, and when it is alleged that the party with the superior
bargaining power has carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers
of consumers out of individually small sums of money, then . . . the waiver
becomes in practice the exemption of the party ‘from responsibility for [its]
own fraud, or willful injury to the person or property of another.’ Under these
circumstances, such waivers are unconscionable under California law and
should not be enforced.
64
AT&T Mobility LLC, 131 S. Ct. at 1745.
58

58
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classwide arbitration ex post.65 A sharply divided Supreme Court
reversed the lower courts’ application of the Discover Bank doctrine in
AT&T Mobility, concluding the FAA preempted the doctrine.66 The
Court stated that this doctrine “interfere[d] with fundamental attributes
of arbitration”67 and that “the switch from bilateral to class arbitration
sacrifices the principal advantage of arbitration – its informality –
which makes the process slower, more costly, and more likely to
generate procedural morass than final judgment.”68 Thus, according to
the Supreme Court, a fundamental attribute of arbitration is the
efficient and speedy resolution of disputes, which would be
undermined by the Discover Bank doctrine.
In the fourth case, American Express Co. v. Italian Colors
Restaurant, a group of plaintiffs again attempted to defeat an
arbitration clause that prohibited class arbitration. However, rather
than relying on a state law, like the plaintiffs in AT&T Mobility, the
plaintiffs in American Express Co. argued the individual cost of
arbitrating their federal antitrust claims exceeded any potential
recovery.69 Applying Section 2 of the FAA, the Court began its
analysis by reminding the parties that courts must “rigorously enforce”
arbitration agreements according to their terms.70 The Court concluded
that the FAA did not permit it to invalidate a contractual waiver of
class arbitration on the ground that the plaintiff’s cost of individually
arbitrating a claim exceeded the potential recovery.71
Thus, in the foregoing cases the Court disempowered an arbitrator
to make determinations of class arbitration, compelling bilateral
arbitration unless otherwise agreed; over-empowered an arbitrator to
65

Id. at 1750.
Id. at 1753.
67
Id. at 1748.
68
Id. at 1751.
69
Am. Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
70
Id. at 2309 (citation omitted). Particularly interesting is the court’s statement
that “courts must rigorously enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms,
including terms that specify with whom the parties choose to arbitrate their disputes
and the rules under which that arbitration will be conducted.” Id. (emphasis added)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted).
71
Id. at 2311–12.
66

59

https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol9/iss1/4

10

Milkowski: Expanding the Scope of the Federal Arbitration Act: An Examinatio

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 9, Issue 1

Fall 2013

determine his own jurisdiction; and expressed a clear disapproval of
class arbitration. The Supreme Court came to these three sweeping
conclusions using the language of the FAA.
III. GREEN V. U.S. CASH ADVANCE ILLINOIS, LLC
In May 2012, U.S. Cash Advance Illinois, LLC and Title Loan
Company (doing business as “the Loan Machine”) offered to roll over
$200 in debt owed by Joyce Green, a senior citizen,72 into a payday
loan in the amount of $1,650.73 The new payday loan agreement and
its Truth-in-Lending Disclosure Statement stated the loan was subject
to a 36% finance charge.74 However, Ms. Green discovered that due to
other charges described in the loan documents, the actual finance
charge exceeded 200% and a bill later provided to her stated the
“effective APR” was 200.84%.75 In light of these finance charges, Ms.
Green brought claims for violations of Truth in Lending Act,76 the
Illinois Consumer Installment Loan Act,77 the Illinois Payday Loan
Reform Act,78 and the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive
Business Practices Act,79 to the Northern District Court of Illinois as a
class representative.80
The payday loan agreement entered into by Ms. Green in May
2012 contained an arbitration clause, which required that all disputes

72

Paul Bland, Activist Seventh Circuit Panel Helps Out Payday Lender by ReWriting Arbitration Clause Picking Corrupt Firm, PUBLIC JUSTICE, (Aug. 2, 2013),
http://publicjustice.net/blog/activist-seventh-circuit-panel-helps-out-payday-lenderby-re-writing-arbitration-clause.
73
Brief of Appellee at *3, Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Illinois, 724 F.3d 787
(7th Cir.) (No. 13-1262).
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2012).
77
205 Ill. Comp. Stat. 670/1 (2012).
78
81 Ill. Comp. Stat. 122/4-10(b) (2005).
79
815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 505/10a (1986).
80
Brief of Appellee at *3–4, Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Illinois, 724 F.3d
787 (7th Cir.) (No. 13-1262).
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between the parties be settled by binding arbitration.81 The arbitration
clause named the NAF as arbitrator.82 However, in July 2009, almost
three years prior to Ms. Green entering her payday loan agreement, the
NAF stopped accepting consumer arbitrations as a condition of its
settlement agreement with the Minnesota Attorney General.83 This
settlement agreement was a result of a law enforcement investigation,
which led to a lawsuit alleging that the NAF was not an impartial
venue.84 As one commentator put it, “the NAF was a deeply corrupt
organization that . . . made . . . promises to lenders that it would favor
them over consumers.”85
Despite the fact that the NAF stopped accepting consumer
arbitration disputes in 2009, the Loan Machine failed to amend its
payday loan agreements to reflect this change.86 In 2012, these loan
agreements still stated that all disputes were to be resolved through
81

Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Illinois, LLC, 724 F. 3d 787, 789 (7th Cir.

2013).
82

Id. at 788.
See Wade Goodwyn, Arbitration Firm Settles Minnesota Legal Battle, NPR
(July 23, 2009, 6:00 AM),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=106913248. Guests of the
show discussed the NAF settlement, and noted that the arbitration forum conducts
hundreds of thousands of consumer arbitrations a year, most of them involving debt
collection. The investigation of the Minnesota Attorney General revealed that NAF
is 40% owned by a hedge fund, which also owned debt collection agencies, making
the NAF a party to the dispute as well as judge and jury. See also Carrick
Mollenkamp, Dionne Searcey & Nathan Koppel, Turmoil in Arbitration Empire
Upends Credit-Card Disputes, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 15, 2009 at 12:01 AM),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB125548128115183913) (noting that another
consumer-debt-arbitration forum, the American Arbitration Association has also
stopped hearing consumer debt cases.).
84
For a copy of the Minnesota Attorney General’s Complaint, see
http://www.ag.state.mn.us/PDF/PressReleases/SignedFiledComplaintArbitrationCo
mpany.pdf (last accessed November 7, 2013). For a brief overview of the lawsuit,
see Minnesota Sues a Credit Arbitrator, Citing Bias, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS WEEK
(July 14, 2009),
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/jul2009/db20090714_95276
6.htm.
85
Paul Bland, supra note 72.
86
Green, 724 F. 3d at 788.
83
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“binding arbitration by one arbitrator by and under the Code of
Procedure of the National Arbitration Forum.”87 In response to Ms.
Green’s complaint, and despite the unavailability of the NAF, the Loan
Machine moved to compel arbitration, stay proceedings, and dismiss
class claims by arguing that Section 5 of the FAA required the court to
appoint a substitute arbitrator.88 This issue was not novel, as other
courts89 have faced the question of what to do with an arbitration
agreement where the named arbitration forum was unavailable.

87

Id.
Brief of Appellee at 4–5, Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Illinois, 724 F.3d 787
(7th Cir.) (No. 13-1262). Paragraph 17 of the loan agreement stated:
ARBITRATION: All disputes, claims or controversies between the parties of
this Agreement, including all disputes, claims or controversies arising from or
relating to this Agreement, no matter by whom or against whom, including the
validity of this Agreement and the obligations and scope of the arbitration
clause, shall be resolved by binding arbitration by one arbitrator by and under
the Code of Procedure of the National Arbitration Forum. This arbitration
agreement is made pursuant to a transaction in interstate commerce, and shall
be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act at 9 U.S.C. Section 1. The parties
agree and understand that they choose arbitration instead of litigation to resolve
disputes. The parties understand that they have a right or opportunity to litigate
disputes through a court, but that they prefer to resolve their disputes through
arbitration, except as provided herein. THE PARTIES WOULD HAVE HAD
A RIGHT OR OPPORTUNITY TO LITIGATE DISPUTES THROUGH A
COURT BUT HAVE AGREED TO RESOLVE DISPUTES THROUGH
BINDING ARBITRATION, EXCEPT THAT THE TITLE LENDER MAY
CHOOSE AT TITLE LENDER’S SOLDE OPTION TO SEEK COLLECTION
OF PAYMENT(S) DUE IN COURT RATHER THAN THROUGH
ARBITRATION. THE PARTIES VOLUNTARILY AND KNOWINGLY
WAIVE ANY RIGHT THEY HAVE TO A JURY TRIAL EITHER
PURSUANT TO ARBITRATION UNDER THIS CLAUSE OR PURSUANT
TO A COURT ACTION BY A TITLE LENDER. The parties agree and
understand that all other laws and actions, including, but not limited to, all
contract tort and property disputes will be subject to binding arbitration in
accord with this agreement.
89
See Khan v. Dell, Inc., 669 F. 3d 350 (3d Cir. 2012); Brown v. ITT
Consumer Fin. Corp., 211 F.3d 1217 (11th Cir. 2000); Ranzy v. Tijerina, 393 F.
App'x 174 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam).
88
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A. Prior Circuit Court Decisions
In deciding what to do when the named arbitration forum is
unavailable, several circuit courts have analyzed the issue by asking
whether the choice of the arbitration forum was an integral part of the
arbitration agreement.90 Applying this test, the Fifth Circuit found a
named forum was integral to the arbitration agreement, and refused to
appoint a substitute arbitrator under Section 5 of the FAA.91 The
Third92 and Eleventh93 Circuits, on the other hand, have applied this
test to similar facts but concluded that a named forum was not integral
to the arbitration agreement and invoked Section 5 to appoint a
substitute arbitrator.
In Ranzy v. Tijerina the Fifth Circuit was confronted with a
consumer action against a payday loan company.94 Similar to the facts
in Green, the loan agreement contained an arbitration clause naming
the NAF as arbitrator.95 After entering the loan agreement but before
litigation, the NAF became unavailable,96 and as a result the loan
company urged the court to use Section 5 of the FAA to appoint a
substitute arbitrator.97 The court stated, “Section 5 does not . . . permit
a district court to circumvent the parties’ designation of an exclusive
arbitration forum when the choice of that forum is an integral part of
90

A number of state court opinions have also adopted the integral part test,
including Illinois, (Carr v. Gateway, Inc., 944 N.E.2d 327 (Ill. 2011)); Virginia,
(Schuiling v. Harris, 747 S.E.2d 833 (Va. 2013)); New Mexico, (Rivera v. Am. Gen.
Fin. Servs., Inc., 259 P.3d 803 (N.M. 2011)); South Dakota, (Wright v. GGNSC
Holdings LLC, 808 N.W.2d 114 (S.D. 2011)); Georgia (Miller v. GGNSC Atlanta,
LLC, 746 S.E.2d 680 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013)); Indiana, (Geneva-Roth, Capital, Inc. v.
Edwards, 956 N.E.2d 1195 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)); Wisconsin, (Riley v. Extendicare
Health Facilities, Inc. 826 N.W.2d 398 (Wis. Ct. App. 2012)); and Pennsylvania
(Stewart v. GGNSC-Canonsburg, L.P., 9 A.3d 215 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010)).
91
Ranzy v. Tijerina, 393 F. App'x 174, 175 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam).
92
Khan v. Dell, Inc., 669 F. 3d 350, 354–56 (3d Cir. 2012).
93
Brown v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 211 F.3d 1217, 1222 (11th Cir. 2000).
94
Ranzy, 393 F. App'x at 175.
95
Id.
96
Ranzy v. Extra Cash of Texas, Inc., CIV.A. H-09-3334, (S.D. Tex. Mar. 11,
2010), aff'd sub nom, Ranzy v. Tijerina, 393 F. App'x 174 (5th Cir. 2010).
97
Ranzy, 393 F. App’x at 175.
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the agreement to arbitrate, rather than an ancillary logistical
concern.”98 Thus, the court asked whether the parties had agreed that
the NAF was the exclusive forum. Noting the agreement stated the
parties “shall” submit all claims to the NAF, the Fifth Circuit found
the NAF was the exclusive arbitration forum and due to the NAF’s
unavailability, allowed the parties to proceed in litigation.99
In reaching this conclusion, the Fifth Circuit relied on a Second
Circuit decision, In re Salomon Inc. Shareholders’ Derivative
Litigation, which is addressed by the Green court.100 The agreement to
arbitrate in Salomon named the New York Stock Exchange as the
forum for dispute resolution.101 Once submitted to the NYSE
arbitrator, the NYSE’s rules allowed its Secretary to decide whether to
hear a dispute or send the parties to court.102 There, the Secretary
invoked his discretion to decline arbitration.103 However, rather than
proceed with litigation, the defendants moved the court to appoint a
substitute arbitrator under Section 5 of the FAA.104 The defendants
argued that the language of the agreement, which required disputes to
be arbitrated by the NYSE and in accordance with its rules, was akin
to a choice of law provision that allowed arbitration to proceed in
another forum using the NYSE rules.105 The Second Circuit rejected
this argument, and declined to appoint a substitute arbitrator because
the parties had contractually agreed that the NYSE and only the NYSE
could arbitrate any disputes between them.106
Like the Fifth Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit considered whether the
choice of the NAF as arbitration forum was an integral part of the
arbitration agreement.107 In Brown v. ITT Consumer Financial Corp.,
98

Id. at 176 (citation omitted).
Id. at 176.
100
Id.
101
In re Salomon Inc. Shareholders’ Derivative Litigation, 68 F.3d 554, 555
(2d Cir. 1995).
102
Id. at 556.
103
Id.
104
Id. at 555–56.
105
Id. at 558.
106
Id. at 559.
107
Brown v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 211 F.3d 1217, 1222 (11th Cir. 2000).
99
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the Eleventh Circuit found no evidence that the choice of the NAF as
the arbitration forum was an integral part of the agreement to arbitrate
disputes.108 In light of this absence of evidence, the court held the
unavailability of the NAF did not destroy the arbitration clause and it
affirmed the lower court’s appointment of a substitute arbitrator.109
Similarly, the Third Circuit in Khan v. Dell, Inc. applied the
integral part test. There, Raheel Ahmad Khan filed a consumer class
action for defectively designed computers sold by Dell.110 When Khan
purchased his Dell computer, he entered into a clickwrap agreement,111
which contained an arbitration provision.112 Like the plaintiffs in
Ranzy and Brown, Khan asserted that the arbitration provision was
unenforceable because the NAF, which was the designated arbitration
forum, was no longer permitted to conduct consumer arbitrations.113
Khan further contended that NAF’s designation was integral to the
agreement.114
The Third Circuit defined the integral part test as the parties
having “unambiguously expressed their intent not to arbitrate their
disputes in the event that the designated arbitral forum is
unavailable.”115 After reviewing the language of the agreement and
considering conflicting interpretations of the same or similar
agreements by other courts, the Third Circuit determined that the
language of the arbitration agreement was ambiguous. In light of the
“liberal federal policy in favor of arbitration,” the court used Section 5
of the FAA to appoint a substitute arbitrator.116

108

Id.
Id.
110
Khan v. Dell, Inc., 669 F. 3d 350, 352 (3d Cir. 2012).
111
A clickwrap agreement appears on an internet webpage and requires that a
user consent to any terms or conditions by clicking on a dialog box on the screen in
order to proceed with the internet transaction. Specht v. Netscape Communs. Corp.,
306 F.3d 17, 22, n.4 (2d Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).
112
Khan, 669 F. 3d at 351.
113
Id. at 353.
114
Id.
115
Id. at 354.
116
Id. at 356.
109
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Although ultimately reaching different conclusions, the three
circuits that have addressed the issue of what to do when a named
arbitration forum is unavailable have agreed that the integral part test
was the correct analysis. The District Court in Green was no different.
B. The District Court Decision: Application of the Integral Part Test
The district court used Section 2 of the FAA to begin its
analysis,117 which provides that written provisions in a contract “to
settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such
contract . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.”118 Thus, as the Supreme Court has repeatedly done, the
district court acknowledged a judicial policy of favoring arbitration.
The district court then used the integral part test as the threshold
analysis to determine whether Section 5 could be invoked.
The district court used five factors pulled from various federal
circuit and district court decisions to determine whether the
designation of the NAF was “integral” to the agreement.119 These
factors were: 1) whether the language designating the arbitrator is
mandatory or permissive; 2) whether the arbitration clause designates
a particular arbitrator or merely a particular set of rules to be applied;
3) whether the arbitration agreement contains a 'severance' provision
or a provision for substitution of the arbitrator; 4) the relative weight
in the arbitration agreement given to the designation of the arbitrator
versus the requirement that disputes be sent to binding arbitration; and
5) whether the arbitrator was likely to have been chosen because of its
unique characteristics.120
First, the district court found that the use of the word “shall”
favored the designation of the NAF as integral to the arbitration
117

Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Illinois, LLC, No. 12 C 8079, 2013 WL
317046, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 25, 2013), vacated and remanded, 724 F.3d 787 (7th
Cir. 2013).
118
Id. (citing 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012)).
119
Id. at *4.
120
Id.
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agreement.121 Second, because the agreement states that arbitration be
conducted by the NAF as well as under its code of procedure, there is
merit in finding that the NAF is an integral part of the agreement.122
Third, the district court found that although the loan agreement had a
severance clause, a severance statement did not appear in the
arbitration agreement itself.123 Therefore, the district court reasoned,
the arbitration agreement would not remain valid if the designation of
the arbitration forum failed.124 Fourth, the plaintiff was required to
arbitrate and the Loan Machine had the option to arbitrate or pursue a
bench trial, and as such the court found this factor to be neutral.125
Lastly, the district court found that the NAF settlement agreement with
the Minnesota Attorney General supported the conclusion that the
Loan Machine selected the NAF as the arbitration forum because of its
pro-business reputation.126
Based on this five-factor analysis, the district court concluded that
the designation of the NAF was integral to the agreement, and as such
the district court could not apply Section 5 of the FAA.127 The district
court allowed the parties to proceed in litigation.
C. An Interlocutory Appeal to the Seventh Circuit
After the district court found the arbitration clause void, the Loan
Machine took an interlocutory appeal to the Seventh Circuit.128 On
appeal, the Loan Machine argued that the designation of the NAF was
an “ancillary logistical concern” and not an integral part of the
agreement, and that a substitute arbitrator should be appointed under
Section 5 of the FAA.129 Green argued that the designation of the NAF
121

Id.
Id. at *5.
123
Id. at *6.
124
Id.
125
Id. at *7.
126
Id.
127
Id.
128
Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Illinois, LLC, 724 F.3d 787 (7th Cir. 2013).
129
Brief of Appellee at *3, Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Illinois, 724 F.3d 787
(7th Cir.) (No. 13-1262).
122
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was integral to the arbitration agreement; therefore, the arbitration
agreement was void and unenforceable.130 In the alternative, Green
argued the court should strike the arbitration agreement as void
because it was a scheme to defraud her, and that NAF’s code of
procedure allowed Green to proceed in court if the NAF was
unavailable.131
1. Chief Judge Easterbook’s Majority Opinion
The majority opinion, written by famously conservative132 Judge
Easterbook, rejected the integral part test and instead stretched the
language of the arbitration agreement to invoke Section 5 of the FAA
to appoint a substitute arbitrator.133
First, the majority rejected the integral part test used by the
district court and other circuit courts.134 The majority called the
integral part test an “escape hatch” that came about in the “fashion of a
rumor chain.”135 They traced the origin of this test to a 1990 Northern
District of Illinois opinion in which Judge Moran, in dicta, stated that
the choice of a particular forum was not “integral” to the parties
bargain.136 The majority stated the background of the FAA does not
authorize such an approach, and because it was not an established rule

130

Brief of Appellant at *11–15, Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Illinois, 724 F.3d
787 (7th Cir.) (No. 13-1262).
131
Id. at *18–25.
132
Mitu Gulati & Veronica Sanchez, Giants in A World of Pygmies? Testing
the Superstar Hypothesis with Judicial Opinions in Casebooks, 87 IOWA L. REV.
1141, 1207 (2002).
133
Green, 724 F.3d at 788–93.
134
Id. at 792–93.
135
Id.
136
Id. at 792. The majority notes that Judge Moran cited to Nat'l Iranian Oil
Co. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 817 F.2d 326, 328 (5th Cir. 1987) and asked whether a
particular arbitration forum was an “essential part of the parties’ bargain.” See
Zechman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 742 F. Supp. 1359, 1364
(N.D. Ill. 1990). The Fifth Circuit’s essential part inquiry in National Iranian Oil
was grounded in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 184, cmt. a, § 185(1) &
cmt. B (1981). See Nat'l Iranian Oil Co., 817 F.2d at 333–34.
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of law, rejected it.137 The majority noted that an integral part test
would also hinder the FAA’s promotion of arbitration as a fast and
economical process because the only way to determine what is integral
is through a fact intensive proceeding in front of a district court
judge.138
The court explored a brief tangent, offering that Section 2 of the
FAA could be a possible foundation for the integral part test.139
Section 2 states arbitration agreements are enforceable “save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.”140 Thus, if a mistake such as naming an unavailable
arbitration forum permits revocation of the contract under state law
principles, the court, in theory, could declare the contract
unenforceable.141 The majority’s fleeting reflection abruptly ended
when they stated that “[t]he identity of the arbitrator is not so
important that the whole contract is vitiated” and continued its analysis
on other grounds.142 The court gave no reason for this cursory
conclusion.
Second, the majority attempted to analyze the plain language of
the arbitration clause to find that Section 5 of the FAA must be
implemented.143 They focused on the phrase “shall be resolved by
binding arbitration by one arbitrator by and under the Code of
Procedure of the National Arbitration Forum.”144 Their overly
simplistic and again unexplained logic is that this language only calls
for the use of the NAF’s Code of Procedure, and not for the NAF itself
to conduct the arbitration.145 The majority tried to support its reading
by stating the reference to the NAF’s Code of Procedure would
otherwise be surplusage, and the only reason to refer to the code of
137

Green, 724 F.3d at 792.
Id. at 792.
139
Id. at 791.
140
Id.
141
Id. Several states have already adopted the integral part test when it comes
to arbitration agreements, including Illinois. See cases cited supra note 90.
142
Green, 724 F.3d at 791–92.
143
Id. at 789.
144
Id. (alteration in original).
145
Id.
138
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procedure is to create the possibility of using it outside the NAF.146
This is the precise argument that was considered and rejected by the
Second Circuit in In re Salomon’s Shareholders Litigation.147
Green argued that the majority’s interpretation conflicted with the
rules in NAF’s Code of Procedure.148 Rule 1.A, in particular, states
“this Code shall be administered only by the National Arbitration
Forum or by any entity or individual providing administrative services
by agreement with the National Arbitration Forum.”149 The majority
retaliated with two other rules of the NAF Code. First, Rule 48.C
states, “[i]n the event a court of competent jurisdiction shall find any
portion of this Code . . . to be in violation of the law or otherwise
unenforceable, that portion shall not be effective.”150 Second, Rule
48.D states, “[i]f Parties are denied the opportunity to arbitrate a
dispute, controversy or Claim before the Forum, the Parties may seek
legal and other remedies in accord with applicable law.”151 Evaluating
Rule 1.A in light of Rule 48.C, the majority deduced that Rule 1.A was
unenforceable and severable because the NAF had ceased conducting
consumer arbitrations.152 Further, the court found that Section 5 of the
FAA is other “applicable law” and properly used as such under Rule
48.D.153
The majority supported its determination to appoint a substitute
arbitrator with opinions from the Third and Eleventh Circuits. The

146

Id. at 790. The court briefly addresses the potential copyright issue that may
arise if another arbitrator uses the NAF’s code of procedure. It concludes, and the
dissent agrees, that copyright law does not include the right to control how the owner
of a copy uses the information it contains. Id. at 794–95.
147
See supra Section II(A).
148
Green, 724 F.3d at 789.
149
Id.
150
Id.
151
Id.
152
Id. at 789–90.
153
Id. at 790.
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court did this even though those circuits used the integral part test,
which the majority had already rejected.154
Lastly, the majority likened the arbitration agreement at issue with
an arbitration clause devoid of detail, which may state “any disputes
arising out of this contract will be arbitrated.”155 The majority
concluded that Section 5 of the FAA would undoubtedly apply to that
detail-free clause, and allow the court to supply particulars.156
However, this argument stretches the imagination after comparing the
majority’s imaginary ten-word clause to the extensive 251-word
arbitration clause in Ms. Green’s loan agreement.157
Perhaps understanding its ad hoc reasoning outlined above, the
majority completed their opinion with a catch-all statement, that “one
thing [is] clear: [the] parties selected private dispute resolution” and
“Section 5 allows judges to supply details in order to make arbitration
work.”158 Therefore, the court vacated the district court’s decision and
remanded for the district judge to appoint a substitute arbitrator.159
The majority opinion was devoid of any analysis based in contract
principles. However, the dissent considers that arbitration is based on
the foundations of contract law, and emphasizes that the fact that the
NAF was never available to the parties was a mistake which renders
the contract voidable.
2. Judge Hamilton’s Dissent
Judge Hamilton began his dissent by reflecting on the majority’s
reasoning as “an extraordinary effort to rescue the payday lenderdefendant from its own folly, or perhaps its own fraud.”160 Judge
Hamilton correctly opined that arbitration is a matter of contract, and
154

Id. 790–91 (These opinions are Khan v. Dell, Inc., 669 F.3d 350 (3d Cir.
2012); Pendergast v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 691 F.3d 1224 (11th Cir. 2012); and
Brown v. ITT Consumer Financial Corp., 211 F.3d 1217 (11th Cir. 2000)).
155
Id. at 792 (internal quotation marks omitted).
156
Id.
157
See supra note 88 for the complete language of the arbitration clause.
158
Green, 724 F.3d at 793.
159
Id.
160
Id. at 793 (Hamilton, J., dissenting).
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reminded his readers that the Supreme Court has reflected, “the FAA’s
proarbitration policy does not operate without regard to the wishes of
the contracting parties.”161
Judge Hamilton contextualized his dissent by stressing the unique
facts of the case.162 He reminded the reader that the NAF was sued for
consumer fraud, and as a result settled the case and announced it
would no longer accept consumer cases for arbitration.163 Furthermore,
the payday loan agreement between Ms. Green and the Loan Machine
was a contract of adhesion.164 After engaging in the legal fiction that
Ms. Green “read, understood, and embraced” the arbitration
agreement, the dissent framed the issue as: what was the parties’
mutual intention for what would happen to their arbitration agreement
if the NAF were not available to perform the arbitration?165
Like the majority, the dissent analyzed the plain language of the
arbitration agreement, focusing on the words “shall be resolved by
binding arbitration by one arbitrator by and under the Code of
Procedure of the National Arbitration Forum.”166 Breaking down this
clause into several elements, Judge Hamilton concluded that “there
was no indication that anyone other than the [NAF] was satisfactory to
the parties.”167 Judge Hamilton also argued that the natural reading of
the phrase suggested that the arbitration would be conducted by the
NAF and according to the NAF rules.168
Unlike the majority, which severed the rules of the NAF Code of
Procedure that did not support its opinion, Judge Hamilton used the
161

Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 794.
163
Id. The Third Circuit in Khan, discussed in Section II(A), framed the
integral part test as: did the parties unambiguously express their intent not to
arbitrate their disputes in the event the named forum became unavailable? Khan v.
Dell Inc., 669 F.3d 350, 354 (3d Cir. 2012). Although the dissent rejects the “integral
part” test, perhaps it is only in name as Justice Hamilton’s inquiry is merely another
side of the question posed by Khan.
164
Green, 724 F.3d at 794.
165
Id.
166
Id. at 794–95.
167
Id. at 794.
168
Id.
162
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Rules in a common sense way to support the natural reading of the
arbitration agreement.169 The dissent found that applying “simple
logic” to Rule 1.A meant the terms of the parties’ contract required the
application of the NAF’s Code of Procedure.170
Section 5 of the FAA allows appointment of a substitute arbitrator
in three circumstances.171 First, when the agreement does not provide
for a method in naming the arbitrator.172 This does not apply to the
agreement between Ms. Green and the Loan Machine because a
method was provided.173 Second, if a method was provided but a party
failed to avail itself of such a method.174 Again, this does not apply to
the facts at hand.175 Third, if for any other reason there is a lapse in
naming the arbitrator.176 This residuary phrase did fit, thus, whether
Section 5 applied depended on what was a “lapse.”177 The dissent
summarily found that there was no correctable “lapse” when the
drafters of the agreement named an arbitration forum that was never
available.178
The dissent noted that no other circuit with which the majority
agreed has adopted the same reasoning, or has gone through such
lengths to “rescue a more deeply flawed” arbitration agreement.179
The dissent relied on the logic from a Second Circuit case, In re
Salomon Inc. Shareholders’ Derivative Litigation, to conclude that the
arbitration agreement was void.180 The dissent argued that Salomon
169

Id. at 795–96.
Id. at 795. Judge Hamilton engages in a brief aside whereby he agrees with
the Majority opinion that copyright law does not prevent others from using the Code
of procedure. Id. However, he does note that trademark law may prevent competitors
from using the Code because the NAF branded itself by building a strongly probusiness reputation. Id. at 791–92.
171
Id. at 796.
172
Id. at 797.
173
Id.
174
Id.
175
Id.
176
Id.
177
Id.
178
Id.
179
Id. at 796.
180
Id. at 797–98.
170
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was on all fours with the instant matter.181 As discussed in Section
II(A), under the arbitration agreement in Salomon, all disputes were to
be conducted by the NYSE and in accordance with their rules.182 If the
NYSE refused to arbitrate a particular dispute, there was no further
promise to arbitrate in another forum.183 Although neither the Salomon
nor Green arbitration clauses used the word “exclusive” to designate
the forum, that was the meaning inferred.184
Additionally, Rule 48.D allowed the NAF to decline the use of
arbitration for any dispute, after which the parties could seek legal and
other remedies.185 The dissent’s understanding of Rule 48.D was in
concert with the opinion of the Chief Executive Officer of the NAF. In
an interview with National Public Radio just after the July 2009
Minnesota settlement agreement, Chief Executive Officer Mike Kelly
stated, “the logical conclusion of this decision is that the consumer
cases will all now be brought in court.”186
Although agreeing with the majority’s criticism of the nonstatutory integral part test for deciding when to invoke the court’s
Section 5 power, the dissent came to the right conclusion that the NAF
was the exclusive forum, and because it was unavailable, the parties
should be able to proceed in litigation without being blocked by
Section 5 of the FAA.
D. Missed Connections in the Majority Opinion
The majority opinion did not address contract law principles when
defining the issues in Green. It did not consider whether there was a
181

Id. at 798. The majority opinion distinguishes Salomon based on the
language of the arbitration agreement (which used the word “exclusive”) and that
Salomon arbitrator had discretion to send the dispute to court.
182
Id. at 797.
183
Id.
184
Id.
185
Id. at 798.
186
See Wade Goodwyn, Arbitration Firm Settles Minnesota Legal Battle, NPR
(July 23, 2009, 6:00 AM)
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=106913248 (discussing the
NAF settlement).
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meeting of the minds, even as a legal fiction, or whether there was a
mistake in a term of the arbitration agreement.
While on its short digression tethered to contract law, the majority
failed to contemplate that the integral part test is analogous to asking
whether a term in a contract is material. Inquiring whether the named
arbitration forum is integral to the agreement is similar to asking if the
identity of the forum was a material term in the agreement. A contract
requires mutual assent to all material terms.187 A material term is a
contractual provision, which concerns a significant issue such as
subject matter, quantity, quality, duration or type of work to be
done.188
A mutual mistake of a material fact occurs when there has been a
meeting of the minds, but both parties are mistaken about the same
material fact within the contract. As the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts states, where a mutual mistake was made, the contract may
be voidable.189
Simply put, there is a term in the arbitration agreement that was
based on a mutual mistake of fact – the availability of the NAF as an
arbitration forum. Thus, the fact situation in Green was different than
the named forum becoming unavailable during the life of the contract,
which was the case in Ranzy, Brown and Khan. However, what to do
when the NAF was the designated forum in the Green arbitration
agreement is appropriately addressed by the Third, Fifth and Eleventh
circuits which have asked, whether the named arbitration forum was
“integral” to the agreement, or, under the terms of contract law,
whether the term was material.

187

Citadel Grp. Ltd. v. Washington Reg'l Med. Ctr., 692 F.3d 580, 589 (7th
Cir. 2012).
188
Material Term Definition, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009),
available at Westlaw BLACKS.
189
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 152 (1981).
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IV. THE AFTERMATH
A. Consequences of the Majority Opinion
The arbitration law created by the Supreme Court and expanded
by the Seventh Circuit allows businesses to prey on consumers. As one
commentator has stated, “[a]s architecture, the arbitration law made by
the Court is a shantytown. It fails to shelter those who most need
shelter. And those it is intended to shelter are ill-housed.”190 The
majority’s opinion, which has been called “one of the most anticonsumer”191 decisions of the year, has helped create this shantytown,
resulting in immediate repercussions on the parties involved as well as
future litigants.
An immediate consequence of this opinion is that it denies Ms.
Green her day in court and forecasts she will lose in arbitration. It has
been established that the NAF is prejudicial to consumers. Thus
requiring a substitute arbitrator to use NAF’s Code of Procedure may
translate this prejudice into another forum. One major criticism of
arbitration forums like the NAF is that their process inherently favors
business over the individual.192 A display of this inequality can be
found in California, where arbitration results are made public, and
creditors won 99.8% of the time in NAF cases that were decided by
arbitrators on the merits.193

190

Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 SUP.
CT. REV. 331, 401 (1996).
191
Paul Bland, supra note 72. Paul Bland argued the appeal in Discover Bank,
discussed in Section II. Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal.
2005).
192
See Courting Big Business: The Supreme Court's Recent Decisions on
Corporate Misconduct and Laws Regulating Corporations, U.S. SENATE COMM. ON
THE JUDICIARY (July 23, 2008),
http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/hearing.cfm?id=e655f9e2809e5476862f73
5da13e81c7 (Elizabeth Harholet stating, “I concluded from this experience that the
NAF process was systematically biased in favor of credit card companies and
against debtors.”).
193
Id.
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There are also practical problems that result. The dissent considers
the broad power the majority bestowed upon district courts.194 It opens
the door to altering other terms of the arbitration agreement. The
designation of an arbitration forum “has wide-ranging substantive
implications that may affect, inter alia, the arbitrator-selection process,
the law, procedures, and rules that govern the arbitration, the
enforcement of the arbitral award, and the cost of the arbitration.”195
In addition, requiring the district court to appoint a substitute
arbitrator in the instant matter is in contravention to the FAA’s purpose
of eliminating the costly and time-consuming litigation process. The
consumer must first bring a cause of action to the district court so that
the court may invoke Section 5 of the FAA to appoint a different
arbitrator. Although the majority rejected the integral part test as time
consuming and inefficient, the result of their opinion is no better: it
adds an extra step in resolving disputes, which results in additional
time and costs.
Furthermore, appointing a substitute arbitrator in this situation is
in direct opposition to the initial congressional support of the FAA.
During the 1924 Joint Hearings, a supporter of the bill stated that the
reason for the prior judicial hostility towards arbitration agreements
was that stronger parties can prey on weaker ones, but that was no
longer a concern at the time the FAA was passed. That worry,
however, has arisen again due to the unequal bargaining power of a
consumer and payday lender.
B. Proposed Solutions
Mounting arbitration reform efforts have slowly chipped away at
the seemingly irrebuttable presumption that courts have given to the
validity and enforcement of arbitration agreements. The power of state
governments to step in and protect consumers has been weakened as a
result of AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion and thus a state response
is inappropriate. However, in the legislative arena, Congress has
194

Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Illinois, LLC, 724 F.3d 787, 800 (7th Cir.
2013) (Hamilton, J., dissenting).
195
Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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considered a variety of bills that would invalidate pre-dispute
arbitration agreements in consumer contracts. And, in the regularity
sphere, the newly created Consumer Financial Protection Bureau may
be helpful.
Two recently proposed laws aimed at eliminating contract
provisions hidden in fine print that force people to arbitrate rather than
go to court and/or participate in class actions196 are the Arbitration
Fairness Act of 2013 and the Consumer Mobile Fairness Act of 2011.
The Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013 declares that no pre-dispute
arbitration agreement is valid or enforceable if it requires arbitration of
an employment, consumer, anti-trust or civil rights dispute.197 This
proposed law has had several predecessors: the Consumer and
Employee Arbitration Bill of Rights which gave way to the Arbitration
Fairness Act of 2002, followed by the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007
and then the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009.198 The text of the 2013
196

Mike Sacks, Arbitration Kickback: Supreme Court’s Anti-Consumer Rulings
Trigger Democratic Bills, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 20, 2011, 4:09 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/10/20/arbitration-supreme-court-decisionsdemocratic-bills_n_1022207.html. Sacks notes that the three 2010-2011 Supreme
Court decisions have divided the Supreme Court among familiar ideological lines
like in abortion, affirmative action or campaign finance cases.
197
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013, H.R. 1844, 113th Cong. (2013). At the
time of publication, this bill was referred to the Subcommittee on Regulatory
Reform, Commercial And Antitrust Law. More information is available at
http://beta.congress.gov/bill/113th/house-bill/1844. As the sponsor stated in the
Bill’s introduction:
Too many Americans are forced to give up their rights to have a trial by
jury when it comes to these consumer agreements that they sign with
these megabusinesses. My bill would remedy this by prohibiting any
predispute agreement that requires arbitration for claims involving
employees, consumers, civil rights, and antitrust. We must protect our
constitutional right to a fair trial by a jury of one's peers. I will continue
to champion this bill until it is signed into law, and I urge my colleagues
to support the Arbitration Fairness Act.
113 Cong. Rec. S1, 2448 (daily ed. May 7, 2013) (statement of Rep. Hank Johnson).
198
Andrea Doneff, Arbitration Clauses in Contracts of Adhesion Trap
"Sophisticated Parties" Too, 2010 J. DISP. RESOL. 235, 258 (2010). Although these
predecessors were not passed, they did give way to the Franken Amendment to the
May 19, 2010 Department of Defense appropriation bill. The Franken Amendment
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Act is an amendment to the FAA. It begins with several congressional
findings, including: the FAA was not intended to apply to consumer
disputes; most consumers have little or no meaningful choice whether
to submit their claims to arbitration; and mandatory arbitration
undermines public law because there is inadequate transparency and
judicial review of arbitrator’s decisions.199 The Act declares that no
pre-dispute agreement to arbitrate shall be valid if it requires
arbitration of a consumer dispute.200
Similarly, the Consumer Mobile Fairness Act of 2011, which was
introduced by a supporter201 of the Arbitration Fairness Act, sought to
ban pre-dispute arbitration agreements for mobile phone service
“prohibits the use of funds made available by the legislation for any contract in
excess of $1 million unless the defense contractor agrees not to require arbitration of
Title VII or tort claims arising out of sexual harassment or assault as a condition of
employment.” Id.
199
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013, H.R. 1844, 113th Cong. (2013). At the
time of publication, this bill was referred to the Subcommittee on Regulatory
Reform, Commercial And Antitrust Law. More information is available at
http://beta.congress.gov/bill/113th/house-bill/1844. Section 2 of the Act states,
(1) The Federal Arbitration Act (now enacted as chapter 1 of title 9 of the
United States Code) was intended to apply to disputes between commercial
entities of generally similar sophistication and bargaining power.
(2) A series of decisions by the Supreme Court of the United States have
interpreted the Act so that it now extends to consumer disputes and
employment disputes, contrary to the intent of Congress.
(3) Most consumers and employees have little or no meaningful choice
whether to submit their claims to arbitration. Often, consumers and employees
are not even aware that they have given up their rights.
(4) Mandatory arbitration undermines the development of public law
because there is inadequate transparency and inadequate judicial review of
arbitrators' decisions.
(5) Arbitration can be an acceptable alternative when consent to the
arbitration is truly voluntary, and occurs after the dispute arises.
200
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013, H.R. 1844, 113th Cong. (2013). At the
time of publication, this bill was referred to the Subcommittee on Regulatory
Reform, Commercial And Antitrust Law. More information is available at
http://beta.congress.gov/bill/113th/house-bill/1844.
201
Senator Richard Blumenthal introduced the bill on October 4, 2011.
Consumer Mobile Fairness Act of 2011, S. 1652, 112th Congress (2011). More
information is available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d112:s.01652:.
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contracts.202 Thus, this was a direct result of the Concepciones
opinion. This bill has had no movement since its introduction.203
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, on the other hand, is
a regulatory office conducting a study of consumer arbitration in
connection with financial products and services.204 This study is a
requirement of Section 1028(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act. Under the
Dodd-Frank Act, the Bureau is also authorized to “prohibit or impose
conditions or limitations on arbitration agreements relating to a
consumer financial product or service, if that prohibition, condition, or
limitation is in the public interest and for the protection of
consumers.”205 The Bureau has not yet released such a report.
CONCLUSION
The Seventh Circuit opinion in Green v. US Cash Advance
supports the Supreme Court’s zealous enforcement of arbitration
agreements and the “virtually irrebuttable federal preference for
arbitration.”206 The majority’s ad hoc analysis, while rejecting the
integral part test used by other circuit courts, begs the question – are
arbitration agreements binding, valid and enforceable at all costs? Is
the intent of the parties no longer a relevant question in contract
interpretation? The dissent, although rejecting the integral part test,
ultimately arrived at the correct conclusion through sound reasoning.
Judge Hamilton used a common sense reading of the arbitration
provision to determine the NAF was the exclusive but unavailable
forum. As a result, and mindful that this was contract of adhesion, the
right result would be to allow litigation.
202

Janet Cooper Alexander, To Skin A Cat: Qui Tam Actions As A State
Legislative Response to Concepcion, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1203, 1212 (2013).
203
Consumer Mobile Fairness Act of 2011, S. 1652, 112th Congress (2011).
More information is available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/bdquery/z?d112:s.01652:.
204
CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU,
http://www.consumerfinance.gov (last visited Dec. 28, 2013).
205
12 U.S.C. § 5518(b) (2012).
206
Alexander, supra note 202, at 1204.
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